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Thrasymachus on Justice, Rulers, and Laws in 
Republic I 
Stephen Everson 
1.   According to Thrasymachus at Republic I 338c, ‘justice is nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger’. At 338e, he then declares that ‘justice 
is the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule’ (τὸ τῆς 
καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον, 338e6–339a2). Half-a-Stephanus-page 
further on, we find him endorsing as his own the claim that ‘whatever laws 
[the rulers] make must be obeyed by their subjects, and this is justice’  
(339c) and then, after tussling with Socrates for a page and a half, he repeats 
his claim that it is just to do what is to the advantage of the stronger (341a). 
Finally, at 343c, he maintains as if obviously true that ‘justice is really the 
good of another’ and this turns his attention from considering the relations 
between rulers and their subjects to those between people more generally. 
That Plato should put such a swarm of different characterisations of justice 
into Thrasymachus’ mouth in such short order hardly seems designed to 
give his reader confidence that they collectively manifest a single and 
coherent view of justice, let alone a compelling or even plausible one. 
Nevertheless, whilst Plato’s commentators have generally been quick to 
dismiss Socrates’ first two interlocutors in Republic I as intellectually 
inadequate to the task of joining him in the investigation of justice, they 
have been much less willing to accept at face value Plato’s portrait of 
Thrasymachus as careless or confused. Indeed, it has become something of 
a standing challenge to the ingenuity and philosophical acumen of Plato’s 
interpreters to show that Thrasymachus’ various claims can be given a 
reading that renders them consistent without making them intolerably 
vague. 
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In an earlier paper, ‘The Incoherence of Thrasymachus’ (hereafter ‘IT’), I 
argued that that challenge is not one that the interpreter of the Republic 
can, or should even try to, meet. Not only are the claims about justice made 
by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic actually inconsistent, 
they are intended by Plato to be so.1  In fact, so I argued, not only is there a 
fault-line between the claims that justice is what is advantageous the 
stronger and that it is the good of another, but the first of these is used to 
articulate two different positions which are also themselves inconsistent. 
Amongst a number of attempts by commentators to defend Thrasymachus’ 
philosophical honour against my charges of confusion and incoherence, 
one of the most sophisticated and textually attentive has come from C.D.C. 
Reeve. On Reeve’s account of Republic I, not only is Thrasymachus not, as 
I had it, ‘the sort of person who is not argumentatively careful and who is 
capable of holding what are in fact contradictory views without realising it’ 
(IT, p. 130), he is actually a careful and indeed powerfully insightful 
political thinker.2 His account of justice, according to Reeve, ‘is a coherent 
and resourceful blend… of ethical realism and semantic conventionalism, 
which identifies justice in each city with what is advantageous to its 
stronger ruler, and the semantic content of “justice” with what its particular 
laws prescribe’. 3   Far from accepting that Plato uses Thrasymachus to 
suggest that the various positions he conflates are each likely to prove 
attractive to the kind of incautious thinker who would conflate them, Reeve 
argues that Plato takes Thrasymachus to hold consistently to an account of 
 
1 S. Everson, ‘The Incoherence of Thrasymachus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XVI (1998), 
99–131.  
2 C.D.C. Reeve, ‘Glaucon’s Challenge and Thrasymacheanism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
XXXIV (2008), 69–103. All references to Reeve will be to this paper unless specified otherwise. 
3 Reeve, p. 98 
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justice that makes him a ‘worthy opponent’ of  the Socrates of the Republic, 
and therefore, it would seem, of Plato himself.4   
Using Reeve’s riposte to IT as a spring-board, I want here to explore in 
greater depth Thrasymachus’ arguments at 338–341 for his claim that 
justice is what is to the advantage of the stronger and in particular the effect 
of his introduction of the ‘precise’ notion of a ruler as one incapable of 
making legislative errors. I shall argue that, despite Reeve’s endeavours to 
reconcile what Thrasymachus says before this with the position he 
articulates in doing so, that new position does indeed force Thrasymachus 
into making claims that are inconsistent with the argument he initially 
gives for his opening statement about what justice is. However, although 
the arguments that Thrasymachus offers for that statement are, despite 
what he says, different, the content of that statement itself is unaffected by 
this. Whether the effect of this is to diminish the confusion in 
Thrasymachus’ position I am not sure—certainly, as I shall argue in the 
final section it does nothing to touch the central incoherence in his claims 
about what justice is. 
I shall divide 338–341 into two parts. The first—[A]—runs from 338c, when 
Thrasymachus offers his answer to the question ‘What is justice?’, to 340c, 
when Socrates asks him whether he actually wanted to say not that justice 
is what is to the advantage of the stronger but merely that it is what the 
stronger believes to be to their advantage. The second—[B]—runs from 
340a to 341a, during which Thrasymachus rejects that proposal and 
elaborates a view according to which rulers are to be understood as experts 
incapable of making errors in ruling and ends up claiming to reaffirm the 
answer he gave at the start. A key question to be addressed is whether the 
 
4 Reeve, p. 86 
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position articulated by Thrasymachus in [A] is the same as that which he 
elaborates in [B]. 
 
2.  ‘Listen, then, I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the 
stronger,’ says Thrasymachus at 338a giving his ‘fine answer’ to the 
question of what justice is. As an answer to that question, however, it is far 
from perspicuous and Socrates duly professes himself unable to evaluate it. 
To clarify what it is supposed to mean, Thrasymachus appeals to the 
behaviour of the rulers of states:  
Don’t you know that some states are ruler by a tyranny, some by a 
democracy, and some by an aristocracy? 
 Of course.  
And in each state this element is stronger, namely, the ruler.  
Certainly. 
And each makes laws to its own advantage. Democracy makes 
democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the 
others. And they declare what they have made—what is to their own 
advantage—to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone who 
goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice 
is, the same in all states, the advantage of the established rule. Since 
the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly 
will conclude that the just is the same everywhere, namely, the 
advantage of the stronger.5 (338d–339a) 
 
This is sufficient for Socrates to begin to examine Thrasymachus’ opening 
claim to see whether it is correct. His first move is to make sure that 
Thrasymachus is, as he takes him to be, committed to the claim that it is 
just to obey the rulers, which then provides the ground for Socrates’ attack: 
 
5 I have generally stuck by Reeve’s own translations of the Republic from J.M. Cooper, (ed.), Plato: 
Complete Works (Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997). There have been, however, a few occasions when 
the urge to revise has been too great to resist. 
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Tell me, don’t you also say that it is just to obey the rulers?  
I do.  
And are the rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error?  
No doubt they are liable to error.  
When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some 
correctly, others incorrectly?  
I suppose so.  
And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the rulers’ own advantage 
and incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage? Is that what 
you mean?  
It is.  
And whatever laws they make must be obeyed by their subjects, and 
this is justice?  
Of course.  
Then, according to your account, it is just to do not only what is to the 
advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is not to their 
advantage.  (339b–d) 
 
We can discern three relevant claims in Thrasymachus’ opening 
presentation: 
 (1) Justice is nothing other than what is to the advantage of the 
stronger. 
 (E) The rulers of states always enact legislation that is to their 
advantage. 
 (2) Justice is the advantage of the established rule.  
To these we can add the claim which Thrasymachus does not initially put 
forward himself, but which his argument assumes (and which Socrates 
makes explicit): 
 (3) Justice is obeying whatever laws are enacted by the ruler.  
Socrates’ objection works by calling (E) into doubt, so that Thrasymachus’ 
commitment to (3) will then undercut his ability to maintain (1): if it is just 
to obey whatever laws are enacted by the ruler of a state, and some legally 
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required actions are to the disadvantage of the ruler, just actions are as a 
class no more to the advantage of the ruler than they are to their 
disadvantage.  
 
3. To get from (3) to (2), and hence to (1), Thrasymachus appeals to 
the legislative behaviour of rulers. The ruling element in a state enacts 
legislation that is to its own advantage and so if one acts in a way that is 
required by the law one will act to the advantage of the rulers who enacted 
it. Socrates’ objection is straightforward. Even if rulers always intend to 
enact laws that are to their own advantage, it does not follow that the laws 
they actually enact are to their advantage, since rulers can make mistakes 
when legislating. Thrasymachus’ argument would only go through if rulers 
were infallible—and this is what, of course, Thrasymachus precisely does 
then assert to save his argument. ‘Do you think I’d call someone who is in 
error stronger at the moment he errs,’ he demands, and proceeds to 
distinguish a precise sense of ‘ruler’, according to which rulers are 
legislatively infallible. To be a ruler is to exercise the art, the techne of ruling, 
and no incorrectly enacted law will be the result of the exercise of that art; 
a ruler who makes a mistake is no ruler at all.   
Strictly speaking, then, a ruler can never make mistakes, since in making a 
mistake they would not comply with the conditions for being a ruler: 
But the most precise answer is this: A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, 
never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, 
and this his subject must do. Thus as I said from the first, it is just to 
do what is to the advantage of the stronger. (340e–341a) 
 
Once again, Socrates is prompted to ask for clarity as to what 
Thrasymachus is saying:  
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Define (διόρισαι) clearly whether it is the ruler and stronger in the 
ordinary sense or in the precise sense (τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν 
ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ) whose advantage you said it is just for the weaker to 
promote as the advantage of the stronger.  
I mean the ruler in the most precise sense (τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ 
λόγῳ). 
 
What this alerts the reader to, of course, is the possibility of ambiguity in 
Thrasymachus’ definition of justice. Thrasymachus concedes that when he 
first admitted (at 339c) that rulers are not infallible, he was using the term 
‘ruler’ loosely but now maintains that his statement that justice is the 
advantage of the stronger, that is the ruler, the term is to be understood in 
its precise usage.  
Socrates is not being pedantic in checking this last point, since the upshot 
of Thrasymachus’ appeal to a precise use of ‘ruler’ to secure his claim that 
rulers are infallible is that the truth-value of a sentence containing the term 
will depend on whether the term is used loosely or precisely and this will 
not be apparent on its face.6 The potential for confusion that arises in the 
Greek is not lost in translation and it will help to have a device to mark the 
difference in senses that the word has in its uses. So as to avoid confusion, 
I shall follow Reeve and talk of ‘E-rulers’ and ‘T-rulers’, where the first 
conforms to Thrasymachus’ loose and the second to his precise use of the 
term.7  
 
6 One generally needs to be very wary of translations of Plato and Aristotle which invoke the notion 
of sense but, even duly wary, we can accept the use of ‘sense’ in Reeve’s translation above with a fairly 
clear conscience.  
7 In IT, I followed Reeve’s earlier discussion in his Philosopher-Kings in using ‘ruler’ and ‘Ruler’ to 
effect this distinction (see his Philosopher-Kings (Princeton/Oxford, 1998) p. 12f). In the later paper, 
Reeve changes his terminology to that which I have adopted here. One advantage of the new over the 
earlier terminology is that the new terms do not create ambiguity when used at the beginning of 
sentences.  
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Thrasymachus is clear that the claim he is committed to from 341a is that 
justice is to the advantage of the T-ruler. What is less clear is whether we 
can take him to have made the same claim at 339a when he appeals to the 
behaviour of those in power in states to clarify his opening definition of 
justice. In IT, I argued that we cannot. The account of justice 
Thrasymachus offers in [A] is what has come to be called a ‘conventionalist’ 
one: ‘to say someone is required by justice to perform a certain action is 
only to say that he is required by the law to do so’ (p. 107). Laws are what 
those in power in a state institute to regulate the actions of the citizens or 
inhabitants of that state and since what those who have power will seek to 
do in legislating is to regulate actions so that their interests are served, when 
citizens act as the laws prescribe they will act to the advantage of the ruler—
and that will be, in the new jargon, the E-ruler. Although Thrasymachus 
seeks to defend that claim against Socrates’ challenge of fallibility by 
introducing, or at least appealing to, the notion of a T-ruler, not only does 
he thereby change it, so that he is not defending the claim he pretends or 
at least takes himself to be, but he also shifts the account of justice itself 
away from being the conventionalist one he first articulated. 8  In now 
placing what is in effect a normative condition on what it is for someone to 
be a ruler—that they should be exercising expertise in instituting a law—to 
determine whether an action is just will now itself require making a 
normative judgement as to whether any candidate law by reference to 
which it is to be evaluated actually served the interests of the supposed ruler 
who instituted it. 
Reeve, in contrast, finds no such change in Thrasymachus’ position at 340c: 
according to Reeve, his claim to be making precise what he has already said 
is to be accepted on its face rather than as masking a move he has been 
 
8 IT, section VII. 
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forced into to meet Socrates’ objection. It should not be seen, that is, as 
introducing the new notion of the ruler–expert, but as clarifying the 
concept of a ruler which is already in play. On his view, Thrasymachus’ 
position is innocent of conventionalism throughout so that [A] and [B] 
taken together present no internal inconsistency.  
Many of Plato’s commentators have regarded the position Thrasymachus 
elaborates in [B] to be a fairly desperate one, avoiding the force of Socrates’ 
objection only at the cost of what Julia Annas for instance writes off as ‘a 
very counter-intuitive position’ which ‘flouts our beliefs about doctors, 
rulers, etc…’ 9  Of course, the more counter-intuitive and the less well 
motivated is Thrasymachus’ position here, the more plausible it will be to 
see him as adopting it merely to stave off Socrates’ challenge. We can 
distinguish two core claims—that rulers are a type of craftsman 
(δημιουργός) and then a conceptual claim about craftsmen generally; that 
no-one is a craftsman of whatever kind when they are making an error in 
respect of their craft. In fact, neither of those claims is unmotivated and 
even the second may have been less counter-intuitive in historical context 
than it now strikes us. How theoretically stable this position is deserves a 
more substantial, and so separate, treatment than I can offer here.10  
My contention that Thrasymachus changes his central thesis so that he 
ends up defending something other than he intends or claims to have been 
defending does not then rest on a principled objection either to the notion 
 
9  Julia Annas,  An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), p. 43 
10 A very interesting recent treatment of the notion of τέχνη and its possession that Thrasymachus 
employs is Tamer Nawar ‘Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1’, Phronesis 
63 (2018), 359–91, who nicely places this in the context not only of the Euthydemus and Charmides, but 
also some of the Hippocratic authors. Although I’m greatly in sympathy with much of what Nawar 
says to show that the infallibilist conception of a skill is indeed theoretically grounded, I remain dubious 
that it can do the work Thrasymachus needs it to do in specifying what it is to be a ruler. I shall not 
pursue that here, however.  
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of a T-ruler or even its theoretical utility. What is at issue is whether one 
can interpret Thrasymachus’ arguments through [A] and [B] so that he is 
making claims about rulers throughout. To use the terms introduced 
earlier, are the conception of an E-ruler and a T-ruler different conceptions 
of the same concept or are they conceptions of different concepts?11 If the 
first, then the restrictions which Thrasymachus places on being a T-ruler 
will simply elucidate what it is to be a ruler—‘E-ruler’ and ‘T-ruler’ will have 
been terms introduced to clarify his arguments, but can then simply fall 
away to leave one talking, as he does, simply of rulers. Alternatively, if those 
restrictions serve to introduce a new concept, then one will not be able to 
lay out Thrasymachus’ arguments through [A] and [B] without such a 
device of disambiguation. At any occasion when he uses the term, it will be 
appropriate to ask, as Socrates does at 341b, which sense the word is 
carrying in order to know what he is talking about.12  
 
4.  It is common ground that Thrasymachus’ argumentative strategy in [A] 
is to derive (2) from (3) and (E), and then (1) from (2).13  It is also common 
 
11 My distinguishing between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ conforms to one standard usage—as set out, 
for instance, by David Wiggins in his Sameness and Substance Renewed (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 10–11. 
12 It is perhaps worth my acknowledging that, for ease of discussion, I am allowing myself to talk as if 
Socrates and Thrasymachus were using the English words that serve here to translate the Greek words 
they actually do use. (One is reminded of the Oxford Greats candidate who declared with some 
impatience that if Aristotle had intended ‘εὐδαιµονία’ to mean happiness, he would have said so.) 
Even if this is not entirely felicitous, it does not, I think, result in any confusion. This is, of course, not 
the only place in Plato where there is a question as to whether the progress of the discussion clarifies 
an existing concept or merely introduces a new one. A prime example of that is Plato’s account of 
justice later in the Republic itself, where he has been charged with setting out to defend one concept of 
justice—‘vulgar-justice’—and defending something quite different—‘platonic-justice’. Here the 
defender of Plato needs to show that the conception of vulgar-justice and that of platonic-justice are 
both conceptions of the concept justice. For such a defence, see my own ‘Justice and Just Actions in 
the Republic,’ in B. Morison  and K. Ierodiakonou (edd.), Episteme, etc. (Oxford, 2012), 249–76. 
13 Common ground, that is, between Reeve and myself. Others read [A] so that Thrasymachus derives 
(3) from (1)—see, for instance, Annas, Introduction, 39–40.  
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ground that in [B] Thrasymachus takes himself to be defending (1) and his 
argument for it against Socrates’ objection that since rulers will sometimes 
make mistakes when they enact laws, not every law will in fact serve the 
interests of the ruler who enacts it. Using the terminology of E-rulers and 
T-rulers, we can take the claim Thrasymachus assents to at 339a to be  
(2a) Justice is what is to the advantage of the (E)-ruler,  
and his implied claim at 341a to be 
(2b) Justice is what is to the advantage of the (T)-ruler. 
So, are (2a) and (2b) the same claim expressed in different terms or are they 
actually different claims?14    
‘E-ruler’ is to have the sense that is conferred on ‘ruler’ when people are 
talking loosely—that is, without the constraint of the possession of 
expertise.  In IT, I argued that the conception of an E-ruler must indeed be 
what we can call a positivist one, where a ruler is merely someone who, or 
some group that, has the power in a state to direct the behaviour of the 
citizens of the state. This goes with a similarly positivist understanding of 
the laws of a state: a law will be a directive passed by whoever is in power 
in whatever is the way specified by the state’s constitution (which in the 
case of tyranny may be simply the tyrant’s issuing decrees or orders). 
 
14 Finding both (2a) and (2b) in the text involves a degree of smoothing out. What Thrasymachus 
actually claims at 339a is that justice is what is in the interest of  ‘the established rule’ (τὸ τῆς 
καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συµφέρον), but although this might allow a distinction to be made between 
a ruling group (say, the aristocracy) and the members of that group (those who are the aristocrats at 
any time), it is clear that Thrasymachus does not intend any such distinction, so that it is harmless to 
take him to be talking of the ruler or rulers here. At 341a he moves immediately from his attempt to 
show that rulers never make mistakes, so that they only pass laws that are to their advantage, to the 
claim that justice is what is to the advantage of the stronger and clearly that move relies on the implicit 
premise that justice is what is to the advantage of the ruler.  
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What’s key is that none of these concepts are normatively constrained. One 
doesn’t need to evaluate a person to determine whether they are a ruler or 
a directive to determine whether it is a law. And from the facts about what 
laws are passed in a state by those with the power to pass them—the E-
rulers—one can, given (3), determine whether an action is just or unjust 
and, again, without needing to appeal to any evaluation of the action.15 
Given (E)—the rulers of states always enact legislation that is to their 
advantage—one thing all just actions at least have in common is that they 
are to the advantage of the E-rulers who enacted the laws to which they 
conform. Reeve, opposing this positivist reading of Thrasymachus’ 
position in [A], finds no hint there of either conventionalism about justice 
or positivism about rulers and laws—and neither, he maintains, does 
Socrates, whose challenge, he thinks, actually requires that Thrasymachus’ 
underlying account of what it is to be an E-ruler is not conventionalist in 
the way I’ve just characterised.  
Once Thrasymachus has sufficiently clarified what he means by (1) for 
Socrates to be able to examine whether it is true and also confirmed that he 
accepts (3), Socrates poses the question as to whether (E)-rulers can make 
mistakes in enacting legislation:  
Tell me, don’t you also say that it is just to obey the rulers? 
I do.  
And are the rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error?  
No doubt they are liable to error.  
When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some 
correctly, others incorrectly?  
 
15 In the light of this, when Thrasymachus demands that Socrates should say what justice is at 336c it is 
not unreasonable to take his prohibition of appealing to various evaluative concepts as an indication of 
methodological principle rather than a denial in advance that justice is something valuable in whatever 
way: ‘Give an answer yourself, and tell us what you say the just is. And don’t tell me that it’s the right, 
the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you 
mean’ (336c–d).  
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I suppose so.  
And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the rulers’ own advantage 
and incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage? Is that what 
you mean? 
It is. (339b–c) 
 
So, a ruler will make a law incorrectly (μὴ ὀρθῶς) if the law is not in fact to 
their own advantage—and given (3), when a citizen or subject obeys that 
law, their action will be just but not to the ruler’s advantage.  
Socrates’ argument here relies on being able to make sense of a ruler’s 
making a mistake and it is this which Reeve takes to show that at least 
Socrates thinks that Thrasymachus is no conventionalist: 
In constructing this trap… Socrates recognizes from the beginning 
that Thrasymachus has a standard of correctness for E-laws in mind, 
namely, that they ‘prescribe what is advantageous for the rulers 
themselves’ (339 c7–8). This is an embarrassment for Everson’s view 
that E is conventionalist, since if it were, there could be no such 
standard and we would have to wonder why Plato sends Socrates off 
on so wrong a foot.16 
 
Reeve takes it as being obvious here that a conventionalist or positivist 
conception of rulers and laws will not tolerate a standard of correctness for 
laws. And, taking that to be obvious, he doesn’t provide any argument to 
confirm that appearance. One possible motivation, however, might be this: 
the point of a positivist account of law is that the conditions for what is to 
count as a law are local. What will count as a law in the France of Louis XIV 
is very different from what will count as a law in fifth-century Athens or 
contemporary Scotland. And any statement of a universal standard for the 
correctness of laws will stand in conflict with that. If that is what Reeve has 
 
16 Reeve, p. 89 
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in mind, an immediate point to make is that whilst the positivist holds that 
what will secure the status of an order or a prescription can, and does, vary 
between different states (or, perhaps better because more broad, between 
different political entities), what it is to have that status should not differ. 
That is, the adoption of a positivist account of laws does not preclude the 
ability to say what a law is.  
Take, for example, Andrei Marmor’s exposition of the ‘command theory of 
law’ that forms the roots of modern legal positivism as developed, say by, 
John Austin: 
The command theory of law… assumes, quite plausibly, that laws 
consist of instructions or directives issued by some people to direct the 
conduct of others. Now, of course, there are many contexts in some 
people tell other people what to do or how to behave. What makes 
action-guiding instructions legal has to do with the origins and the 
function of the guidance: If the guidance emanates from the political 
sovereign and purports to function as an exercise of sovereignty, then 
it is law… So perhaps that is all there is to it: Instructions or 
commands of the political sovereign are what we call law17 
That one should take the central case of law-giving to be that of a sovereign 
issuing commands to their subjects is clearly in sympathy with 
Thrasymachus’ conception of how the rulers of states govern through 
enacting laws. It allows that no more is needed for a command to have legal 
status than that it should be issued by a sovereign but it also allows for 
different states to have different conventions or, more formally, 
constitutions that would place further restrictions on how a sovereign 
might issue a command if it is to count as a law. All of this is consistent with 
positivism but also with the ability to specify in quite general terms what a 
law is (or what it is for an instruction or command to be a law)—and, if one 
 
17 Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton and Oxford, 2011), p. 36. Sovereigns here may be 
individuals, but they may also be institutions, such as the California legislature.  
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can state what a law is, one can also state in quite general terms what may 
make for better or worse laws. There would be no bar, for instance, to 
positing a standard of good drafting or clear formulation: If one is going to 
enact a law or even issue an order, it should be drafted in such a way that 
those to whom it applies should be able to tell what they have to do to 
comply with it. A law which because of failures of drafting can leave that 
open will be a defective law not least (though not only) because it will fail 
properly to secure whatever was the objective for its enactment.  
Reeve might retort to this that whilst a standard of precise formulation 
could indeed by affirmed as applying to all laws of any state without going 
against a positivist account of law, this is because it applies a standard of a 
relevantly different kind to that which is applied by Thrasymachus at 339c. 
Any candidate for being a law will need to be formulated and so it is 
unproblematic to describe ways in which its formulation should be better 
or worse. Consider, in contrast, Austin’s statement of the central claim of 
his positivist account:  
The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. 
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.18 
What Austin has in mind here is a moral or evaluative standard. He is 
taking a stand against, for instance, natural-law conceptions according to 
which an unjust law is no law at all. If Thrasymachus’ standard for legal 
correctness is that the law should be to the advantage of the ruler that is to 
impose an evaluative standard for legal correctness.  
What is at least moot, however, is whether at 339c this is accepted as a 
standard of the kind that Austin rejects. What made the suggested standard 
 
18 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Ed. W.E. Rumble, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 
157 
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of precise formulation acceptable to a positivist was not merely that it 
regulates a feature of any candidate law but that it works as a criterion for 
judging how good any law is as a law. What it does not provide is a standard 
for judging whether any command or instruction is a law at all. One can 
still make perfect sense of the possibility that a law is a bad law because it 
is badly drafted. So what Reeve needs to establish is not merely that 
Thrasymachus accepts that being to the advantage of the E-ruler is a 
standard for the correctness of a law, but that he accepts it as a standard for 
being a law at all. In Austin’s terms, it needs to pertain to a law’s existence 
and not merely to its merit or demerit.  
Now, although Thrasymachus does not re-state the standard once he has 
introduced the notion of the T-ruler, it is certainly an implication of what 
he says at 341a that he would accept this as an existential standard. The 
decrees that a subject must obey are those issued by a T-ruler who is 
exercising their expertise in issuing them and these will necessarily be ones 
that are to the advantage of that T-ruler. But obviously Reeve cannot appeal 
to this as support for taking the standard in the same way when it is stated 
at 399c without begging the question. So one needs to consider the 
dialectical context of that statement if one is to determine whether it is there 
given as an existential or a critical standard for laws. 
Seen in its context, however, it is clear that Thrasymachus does not think 
that an incorrect law is no law at all. Until he understands that his easy 
acceptance of the claim that rulers—E-rulers—can make mistakes in 
legislating will subvert his claim about what justice is, he is entirely 
untroubled by the idea that sometimes a ruler may mistakenly enact a law 
that is to their disadvantage and assents to the claim that ‘whatever laws the 
rulers make’—i.e. whether they are laws that are correct or incorrect—‘they 
must be acted on (ποιητέον) by their subjects’ (339b). If Thrasymachus 
were expressing loosely the precise notions of the T-ruler and of the T-law 
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that he will go on to articulate in order to escape Socrates’ trap, he would 
surely have been prompted by Socrates’ questions themselves to have given 
different answers to them and not waited to have Socrates explain—twice—
why the answers he does give cause the problems for him that they do.  
Up until [B], then, Thrasymachus sees no tension in the possibility of a law 
that is nevertheless incorrectly enacted in that its regulation of behaviour 
does not actually work to the E-ruler’s benefit. One might still wonder, 
however, whether even if the standard for the correctness of laws is critical 
rather than existential this might be in tension with a positivist conception 
of laws and legislation. If there is a single standard for any law according to 
which one can determine whether it is defective, does that not itself require 
one to conceive of laws in terms of some necessary evaluative goal that is 
internal to the practice of law-giving? Should we not see Socrates’ 
assumption that Thrasymachus posits as a standard for the correctness of 
law that it should benefit the E-ruler a recognition that Thrasymachus is 
not, even in [A], operating straightforwardly with a positivist conception of 
laws and then Thrasymachus’ acceptance of that standard as confirmation 
that he indeed is not?  
Socrates’ challenge, of course, picks up on (E), Thrasymachus’ claim at 
338e that E-rulers always enact laws that are to their advantage. Whilst this 
might work as a statement of E-rulers’ purpose, their fallibility means that 
they will not always succeed in securing their advantage and when they 
don’t the law they enact will not achieve the purpose they had for it. Making 
law is, on any account, a purposeful activity and whenever a ruler enacts a 
law, they will have a goal in doing so. On a positivist reading of [A], 
according to which someone will be a ruler if they have the power to enact 
and to enforce legislation and a law will have force just if it has been enacted 
according to the correct constitutional procedures, Thrasymachus believes 
that those who have the power to enact laws always want to regulate the 
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behaviour of their subjects to further the interests of the ruler; whenever 
that is their purpose (which happens to be always), any law which fails to 
do this will be defective. The standard for success is set just by the goal the 
legislator happens to have: of course, it is not accidental that legislators 
have, when legislating, the goal of furthering their interests, but that is not 
because they are legislators or because they are legislating but simply 
because they are human and humans always seek, if unconstrained, to 
further their own interests. There is nothing unstable, then, in thinking that 
every law which fails to further the interests of the ruler signals a failure of 
skill on the part of the legislator whilst denying that this stops them from 
enacting a law or from being a legislator. Even if one thinks that legislating 
is an essential activity of being a ruler, one can allow that legislating is an 
activity that requires skill without making possession of that skill essential 
to being a ruler.  
 
5.   So, that Thrasymachus thinks that a law will be badly made if it doesn’t 
further the interests of the E-ruler is consistent with his holding a positivist 
conception of laws, but it does not in itself, of course, require that. It is not 
an embarrassment for a conventionalist interpretation of [A], but neither 
does it in itself secure it. The ‘in itself  ’is important there, since the 
considerations which restrict the standard so that it is critical rather than 
existential also present a difficulty for a non-conventionalist reading of 
Thrasymachus’ argument. The possibility that an E-ruler may legislate 
badly and enact a law that is in fact not to their advantage, but which, being 
a law, must be obeyed by their subjects, entails that a defective law is 
nevertheless a law—and also, it would seem, entails that that  defective E-
ruler is nevertheless an E-ruler. A similarly defective T-ruler, in contrast, is 
no T-ruler at all.  
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Reeve, who denies that Thrasymachus ever holds to a conventionalist 
understanding of what it is to be an E-ruler, is ingeniously unfazed by these 
considerations, and offers an account of the progress of  Thrasymachus’ 
talk about rulers throughout [A] and [B] that, if correct, will allow one to 
dispense with the pre-fixes and find him to be talking simply about rulers: 
it is simply false to say that Thrasymachus must be talking about E-
rulers when he admits rulers make legislative errors. For part of what 
he does…is to represent such talk as loose. To say that rulers make 
legislative errors is not to talk precisely about E-rulers, he claims, but 
loosely about T-rulers.19  
This then allows, indeed requires, one to find that (E) itself is a claim about 
T-rulers. Reeve acknowledges that this might seem to be in tension with 
Thrasymachus’ grounding it in empirical claims about the behaviour of 
those who actually have power in Greek states, but thinks that this too will 
be eased by understanding how Thrasymachus conceives of the relation 
between E-rulers and T-rulers: 
If E is about T-rulers, however, in what sense, if any, can it be an 
empirical claim about the behaviour of rulers in actual Greek cities? 
While E- and T-rulers, laws, and the rest are excellent expository 
devices, it is a mistake to treat E-rulers as the sort we find in actual 
cities and make empirical claims about, and T-rulers as creatures of 
Thrasymachean ideal theory or fantasy, about whom we make a priori 
or conceptual claims. For Thrasymachus makes it quite clear that T-
rulers are E-rulers at those times when they are actually practising the 
craft of ruling, and so not making errors. When E-rulers are ruling 
correctly, they are T-rulers, therefore, and so—tautologically—never 
make errors.20  
 
19 Reeve, p. 89 
20 Reeve, p. 89 (All italics there are Reeve’s.)  
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We can compare this with Thrasymachus’ own explanation of his initial 
response to Socrates’ objection and his contrast between speaking of rulers 
loosely and precisely:  
I think we do speak with the relevant word in this way (λέγομεν τῷ 
ῥήματι οὓτως), that a doctor makes a mistake, or an accountant, or a 
grammarian. But each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never 
makes a mistake, so that according to the precise account (ὥστε κατὰ 
τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον), and you go in for speaking precisely (ἀκριβολογῇ), 
no craftsman ever makes a mistake. It’s when his knowledge fails him 
that he makes an error, and in regard to that error he is no craftsman. 
No craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake at the moment 
when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a doctor or a 
ruler makes mistakes. It’s in this way that you must also take the 
answer I gave earlier. But the most precise answer (τὸ ἀκριβέστατον) 
is this. A ruler insofar as he is a ruler, never makes mistakes and 
unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must 
do. Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do what is to the 
advantage of the stronger. (340d–341a). 
Thrasymachus thus contrasts the precise account of craftsmen, according 
to which it will not be true that a craftsman ever makes a mistake, with a 
looser way of using the terms for craftsmen where people will indeed say 
that a doctor or ruler or whoever does make mistakes. He acknowledges 
that his claims in [A] involved this looser usage, but that, now using the 
term ‘ruler  ’precisely, what he says will not allow the possibilities that 
Socrates has tried to deploy to block his argument. So, Reeve and 
Thrasymachus are certainly at one in their trying to explain away 
Thrasymachus’ initial acceptance of rulers’ fallibility as the result mere 
loose speaking and in denying that in moving to talk more precisely he 
doesn’t thereby change what he is talking about. What is at issue is whether 
their defence can be made good—and indeed whether in its details it is 
quite the same defence.  
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What, though, does it mean to say that Thrasymachus is talking loosely 
about T-rulers at 339c? One might, it seems, effect a distinction between 
talking loosely and talking precisely about something in various ways. One 
way might be where one imprecisely applies what is a precise criterion for 
applying the relevant concept. So, one might describe a quickly drawn 
shape as a square, even though the angles in contains approximate to being 
right angles when in fact they aren’t. Another might be where the criteria 
for applying a term loosely are sufficient for making a probable judgement 
that something falls under the concept but do not determine that it does—
doing that will require some other or further criterion to be employed. So, 
a doctor might diagnose influenza on the basis of a patient’s symptoms, but 
a certain diagnosis would require PCR testing. Doctors will commonly use 
‘flu’ in that loose way, but still acknowledge that those they diagnose with 
flu may not actually have it. It is not that they’ve improperly or carelessly 
applied the criteria for precise diagnosis of a patient’s infection, but that 
they’ve applied other criteria which are adequate for most practical 
purposes but are accepted to be insufficient to determine the truth of the 
diagnosis. Someone may have flu and yet be asymptomatic, so will not be 
found to have flu on the basis of the loose criteria, or may easily satisfy the 
loose criteria but not have flu.  
It is clear, I think, that it is not the first kind of looseness of talk that is in 
question for Thrasymachus. He is not supposing that ordinarily, say, we 
will judge someone to be a doctor unless they are making a mistake but 
don’t worry too much about whether they have actually made an error of 
diagnosis or treatment. His point is precisely that when we speak loosely 
we will say, and intelligibly so, that a doctor does make mistakes. The 
looseness, then, would need to be of the second kind. The idea, then, would 
be something like this. When Thrasymachus responds to Socrates’ by 
tightening up the conditions for being a ruler, he does not determine a new 
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concept but in effect argues that the existing concept itself, when properly 
understood, makes demands that are often neglected in our ordinary talk. 
Although ordinarily we are ready to talk as if rulers can make mistakes in 
legislating, more careful thought about what it is to be a ruler will show that 
this is in fact incoherent: when one grasps the conditions for being a ruler, 
one will see that they in fact preclude anyone who is making a legislative 
error from complying with it.  
Now, on Reeve’s construal of the argument, someone will satisfy the 
predicate ‘is a T-ruler’ when they are actually exercising the craft of ruling.21 
Anyone who is a T-ruler must also be an E-ruler: only those with the power 
for their laws to be enacted will be able to exercise that craft.  So the notion 
of a T-ruler is certainly more restrictive than that of an E-ruler, but doesn’t 
follow from this that it is a more precise one. It is not that the conditions 
for determining whether someone is an E-ruler are somehow 
indeterminate and in order to resolve that indeterminacy, one needs to 
appeal to the extra condition introduced with the concept of a T-ruler. 
Working out who are and who are not T-rulers will not revise one’s 
judgements as to who are and who aren’t E-rulers—indeed they presuppose 
such judgements have already successfully been made. There is nothing 
wrong with introducing the concept of a T-ruler and it may well be that 
there is some utility in being able to talk just of those rulers who are 
 
21 In fact, Reeve’s claim, cited above, that Thrasymachus makes it clear that someone is only a T-ruler 
when they’re exercising the craft of ruling is at best optimistic. What Thrasymachus says is that one 
wouldn’t call someone a ruler when they’re making a mistake. This would allow them to be a ruler even 
when they’re not exercising the craft as long as they possess the knowledge that would be exercised in 
legislating. Nawar points to Thrasymachus’ claim at 340e that the craftsman makes an error when their 
knowledge fails them to argue that for Thrasymachus error is incompatible not just with the exercise 
of the craft but its possession. If one accepts that then the concept of a T-ruler will be that of an E-
ruler who possesses the craft of ruling and not that of someone who is simply exercising the craft they 
possess. This merits a separate a more detailed discussion than I can offer here, but does not, I think, 
affect the structure of my discussion. Neither concept of T-ruler is one that is required to make 
something more precise of that of the E-ruler.  
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exercising their skill of ruling, but it would be a mistake to think that that 
concept allows one to do better what the concept of being an E-ruler could 
only imperfectly allow one to do.  
It is instructive to compare this with Nicias’ defence in the Laches of his 
proposal that courage can be identified as knowledge of future goods and 
harms. This is very much a revisionary account of what it is to be 
courageous and rests on an acceptance that people’s ordinary grasp of a 
concept is imperfect in a way that leads them to make claims which cannot 
be true. Challenged by Laches with the objection that this would not allow 
animals to be counted as courageous, he is duly unimpressed:  
By no means, Laches, do I call courageous wild beasts or anything else 
that, for lack of understanding, does not fear what should be feared. 
Rather I would call them rash and mad… These cases, which you and 
the man in the street call courageous (ταῦτ᾽οὖν ἅ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα 
καὶ οἱ πολλοί), I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the wise 
people I was talking about. (197b–c) 
People are ordinarily ready to say that lions and leopards are courageous—
as, according to Thrasymachus, they are ready to say that rulers can make 
mistakes—but their willingness rests on a confused grasp of the concept of 
courage and what it is to comply with it. It is not that Nicias is trying to 
introduce a new technical notion of courage; rather he is making a claim 
as to the nature of courage itself, a claim whose truth can be obscured if we 
accept as a starting-point judgements as to who or what can be courageous 
that spring from an imperfect grasp of the concept.  
As we have seen, however, there’s no reason to think that the concept of an 
E-ruler is an imperfect one—nor that Thrasymachus thinks that it is before 
he needs to introduce the supposedly more precise notion of a T-ruler in 
order to escape Socrates’ trap. Here a couple of differences between Nicias 
and Thrasymachus are significant. Whilst Nicias offers an explanation of 
why people have the false beliefs they do about which creatures and people 
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can be courageous—they are confusing courage with rashness—
Thrasymachus would provide no such palliative to his account. If we want 
to say that a ruler has enacted defective legislation, it turns out that we do 
not have the linguistic resources to do so and would have to coin a new 
term to do what we thought the existing term ‘ruler’ was already able to do. 
By distinguishing between ‘ruler’ used loosely and used precisely, that in 
effect is what, of course, Thrasymachus does and why, however 
cumbersome, the interpretative apparatus of ‘E-ruler’ and ‘T-ruler’ has 
continued to be necessary.  
As importantly, Nicias has no need to interpret himself as having spoken 
loosely about courage. As soon as Socrates and Laches raise the question as 
to whether animals can be courageous, Nicias protests that they cannot. 
Thrasymachus, in contrast, immediately assents to the claim that rulers can 
make mistakes—and it is only when it is brought home to him that this 
then blocks his argument for (2) that he moves to restrict the notion of a E-
ruler in the way he tries to do. This is difficult to square with the idea that 
Plato wants us to accept that Thrasymachus from the start takes the 
concept of a ruler to be that of a T-ruler. Had Plato wanted to show that 
Thrasymachus was operating with this technical notion, it would have been 
appropriate for him to have Socrates raise his objection; but then he would 
have had Thrasymachus respond immediately by denying its intelligibility, 
not by accepting its force. Instead of that, Thrasymachus not only allows 
the intelligibility of fallible rulers without hesitation, but accepts that rulers 
actually do make mistakes—and this is puzzling if the position he has 
enunciated is precisely that one should only obey laws passed by rulers who 
meet the strict conditions which he will go on to make explicit.  
Indeed, until Thrasymachus moves to retract his admission that rulers can 
make mistakes, all the participants in the discussion take it as read that his 
conception of a ruler is simply that of someone who has the power to 
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govern a state. Not only does Socrates assume that his argument is 
vulnerable to the obvious empirical fact that rulers do not always legislate 
successfully, but as soon as he has given this as an objection, both 
Polemarchus and Cleitophon take its force to be obvious.22 They differ only 
in that whilst Polemarchus thinks that it provides a knock-down rebuttal 
of Thrasymachus’ conclusion, Cleitophon tries to save something from the 
wreckage by suggesting that Thrasymachus can retreat to the claim that 
justice is what the stronger believes to be to their advantage. When 
Thrasymachus asks, supposedly rhetorically, ‘Do you think I’d call 
someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?’ (340c), the 
disdain in Socrates’  answer is clear: ‘I did think that is what you meant 
when you agreed that rulers aren’t infallible but are liable to error’. Socrates 
thought that Thrasymachus believed this because that is just what he said.  
Socrates rejects Thrasymachus’ attempt to reinterpret what he’s said so as 
to pretend he had said something other than he did. Indeed, Thrasymachus 
himself is half-hearted in his attempt to bluster since within a few lines he 
is rather seeking to explain away what he said as loose talk than to deny he 
said it at all. However, it will not do for him to try to wriggle out of this by 
saying that he was just talking in the way that people ordinarily do, nor for 
Reeve to try to rescue him by glossing this as his talking loosely about T-
rulers. For if Thrasymachus had from the beginning endorsed a conception 
of rulers according to which someone is only a ruler when they are 
exercising their legislative skill, his answers to Socrates’ questions were not 
only strictly but obviously false. Thrasymachus’ opening claims, then, are 
 
22 Reeve is right to say that one can in principle make empirical claims about T-rulers, so conceived, 
just as one can about E-rulers. It might turn out, for instance, that every T-ruler has a glint of 
satisfaction when they legislate. But one claim about them which could not be empirically given, 
because it is ruled out conceptually, is that they sometimes make mistakes in legislating. That would 
precisely undercut the condition for their being a T-ruler at all. 
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about E-rulers —which is why he is initially perfectly prepared to allow 
them to be fallible—and the claim he defends against Socrates’ objection 
concerns T-rulers. Himself using the same term to express these different 
concepts, Thrasymachus remains unaware that he has changed the subject.  
 
6.  There are, however, two aspects of my earlier treatment of 
Thrasymachus in IT that need correction; the first relatively minor and the 
second more substantive. If the present argument has been correct, 
Thrasymachus defends (1) by revising the argument he gives for it. In [A] 
it is secured by (2a), whilst in [B], (2a) is silently renounced, to be replaced 
by (2b). If we take Thrasymachus’ position to be (1) together with the 
claims he makes to secure it, his position in [B] is neither the position of 
[A] nor consistent with it. There will be actions that will count as just 
according to [A] but not according to [B]. Nevertheless, it would be over-
enthusiastic to maintain, as I myself did in IT, that when Thrasymachus 
apparently reaffirms (1) at 341a, he ‘is now putting forward an account 
which is incompatible with the one he began with, but is using the same 
words to do so’ (p. 124). This rested on appealing to Thrasymachus’ retort 
at 340c: ‘Do you think I’d call someone who is in error stronger at the very 
moment he errs?’, which I took to introduce the notion of someone who is 
T-stronger, so that ‘stronger’, like ‘ruler’ is given a novel, more restrictive 
sense. One can, however, appreciate the force of Thrasymachus’ question 
without needing to find that he is using ‘stronger’ in any other sense than 
he had done to this point. We can reasonably take his rejection of the boxer 
Polydamus as an example of someone who has the relevant kind of strength 
to indicate that the kind of strength he has in mind is that of being able to 
control the behaviour of others; a kind of strength exemplified by the rulers 
of states (E- or T-). He can readily claim that someone who tries but fails 
to regulate the behaviour of others to further his own interests does not 
 27 
manifest that kind of strength—so there is no need to find here the 
introduction of some new more restricted kind of strength. If that is right, 
then although Thrasymachus’ position changes between [A] and [B], both 
provide arguments for the same conclusion—that justice is what is to the 
advantage of the stronger.23 
At this point, it might seem that focusing on whether the position 
articulated in [A] is consistent with that of [B] is a distraction from the 
broader and more important issue as to whether (1) is consistent with the 
claim that justice is the good of another. In IT, I took it that in applying the 
normative constraints on who is to count as a ruler and what is to count as 
a law, Thrasymachus moves away from the conventionalism about justice 
which we find in [A] and which is both distinct from and inconsistent with 
the later immoralism, according to which justice is something independent 
of laws but is a bad rather than a good thing. A primary motivation for 
Reeve’s attempt to show that Thrasymachus is talking about T-rulers and 
T-laws even in [A] is to remove any suggestion of conventionalism and so, 
he thinks, any block to reconciling the claims that justice is advantageous 
to the stronger and that it is the good of another. Whether or not the 
position of [A] is a conventionalist one, the more significant issue will be 
whether that of [B] is, since that is the position Thrasymachus ends up 
holding before he moves on to discuss the irrationality involved in the just 
person’s acting with a view to the interests of other people. It may diminish 
our confidence in Thrasymachus if we find that his views change between 
 
23 Ironically, Reeve himself could not allow that Thrasymachus consistently maintains (1) throughout, 
since he maintains that Thrasymachus takes the claim that someone is stronger to be equivalent to the 
claim that they are a ruler, or at least that he identifies the property of being stronger with the property 
of being a ruler (p. 92). If that were right, then the shift from (2a) to (2b) would change the sense of 
‘stronger’, since the concept of being an E-ruler is distinct from that of being a T-ruler. Reeve also takes 
the ‘is’ in (1), (2) and (3) to express identity, whereas in (1) and (2) I take it to be predicative. There is 
not the space to explore that issue here, but I do so in ‘Defining Justice in Republic I’ (MS).  
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[A] and [B] without his realising this—but so long as he does in fact 
abandon any commitment to conventionalism by the time he makes the 
further claim that justice is the good of another, his position at that point 
need not be straightforwardly inconsistent (as it would have been if he had 
not placed the conditions on being a ruler needed to counter Socrates’ 
objection).  
Of course, even if Thrasymachus were to have in [B] moved away from his 
initial conventionalism, this would not be sufficient to show that his views 
on the nature of justice are consistent overall—clearly not every account of 
justice that avoids conventionalism will be consistent with every other such 
account—but it is in any case dubious that [B] does in fact effect such a 
move. This is the second, and more significant, correction that needs to be 
made to the argument of IT. I effectively assumed there that, given (3), a 
positivist account of rulers and laws would simply run together with 
conventionalism about justice—so that Thrasymachus’ abandonment in 
[B] of the first resulted in a similar move away from the second. There is, 
however, no straightforward route from the abandonment of a positivist 
account of rulers and laws to a non-conventionalist account of justice. For 
what secures Thrasymachus’ conventionalism up to his advancing the 
claim that justice is the good of another is his continued adherence to (3)—
that whatever laws a ruler enacts, justice is obeying these. Indeed, his appeal 
to the notions of T-rulers and T-laws to answer Socrates’ objection to the 
argument of [A] is motivated by his desire not only to protect (1) but the 
conjunction of (1) with a version of (3). It would have been quite possible 
for Thrasymachus to have given up (3) as a ground for (1) and to have 
argued, for instance, that strength merits obedience, so that it is just to act 
in the interests of the stronger. Obeying laws that have been enacted by T-
rulers would then be a particular application of that more general principle 
 29 
of justice.24  This, however, would allow justice to stand as a prior and 
independent source of norms for deciding whether to obey any candidate 
law. Thrasymachus does not take that line: certainly, he places normative 
constraints on being a ruler and being a law, but although these then 
determine which actions justice requires—or perhaps rather which actions 
rulers would have us believe justice requires—they are not themselves 
requirements of justice.  
Even in [B], that is, although whenever someone acts justly by acting as the 
laws require them to they will thereby act in the interests of the ruler, they 
can act in the interests of the ruler without acting justly. Because it is only 
necessary and not sufficient that an action should be in the interest of the 
ruler that it should be required by law, which kinds of action will be legally 
prescribed is still a matter of what the ruler happens to decide. If the ruler 
has not bothered to legislate to further their interest in some way, then, 
there will be no requirement either of law or of justice for the subject to act 
as if they had. Which of the actions, or kinds of action, that will be to the 
ruler’s interest are required by law is up to the decision, indeed even the 
whim, of the legislator. The central conventionalist claim—that whether an 
action is just or not depends on which laws happen to be enacted—is 
untouched. Thrasymachus may introduce technical conceptions of rulers 
and laws in order to save his commitment to (1), but even this is not enough 
to bring his legalistic conception of justice into line with what follows from 
343c, when he quietly abandons (3) and allows that the just person’s 
 
24 So, this would seem to be the underlying position of those cited in the Laws who also adopt the 
slogan that ‘justice is whatever is to the advantage of the stronger’. When the Athenian refers to them 
in Laws IV 714bff, he refers back to the discussion in Book III of what should ground authority in the 
state, and associates them with the view that ‘the stronger should rule and the weaker should obey’—
‘a decree of nature, as Pindar of Thebes once remarked’ (690b).  
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willingness to obey the law is but one way in which they subordinate their 
interests to those of other people.  
